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Case No.: 5:17-cv-04207-EJD 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
GOOGLE LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
EQUUSTEK SOLUTIONS INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  5:17-cv-04207-EJD    
 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Re: Dkt. No. 16 
 
 
Plaintiff Google LLC brings this action against Defendants Equustek Solutions Inc., 
Clarma Enterprises Inc., and Robert Angus (together, “Equustek”) to prevent enforcement of a 
Canadian court order requiring Google to delist search results worldwide. Google now moves for a 
preliminary injunction. Equustek has not filed an opposition brief.
1
 Google’s motion will be 
granted. 
                                                 
1
 In its reply brief, Google indicates that Defendant Robert Angus faxed a letter “to Google’s 
counsel” and “to the Clerk of Court for this district.” Dkt. No. 36 at 1. According to Google, the 
letter “declared Defendants’ intention not to defend against Google’s suit” and argued that 
Google’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief is “unnecessary and unfair.” Id. The letter has 
not been filed on the docket for this case, and in any event, the Court does not review or respond 
to letters or letter briefs. See Standing Order II (“Judge Davila does not review or respond to 
letters or letter briefs providing case information or seeking relief from the Court even if the letter 
is filed on the docket.”). As such, the Court will not consider facts or arguments raised in Angus’s 
letter. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
In 2011, Equustek filed suit in Canada against a group of individual and corporate 
defendants associated with Datalink, a rival computer hardware distributor and seller. Compl. 
¶ 17, Dkt. No. 1; Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, Case No. S112421 (Sup. Ct. British Columbia). 
Equustek alleged that Datalink had colluded with a former Equustek engineer to incorporate 
Equustek’s trade secrets into Datalink’s products, and that Datalink misled customers who 
believed they were buying Equustek’s products. Compl. ¶ 5. In 2012, Equustek obtained several 
Canadian court orders against Datalink. Id. ¶ 18. Datalink refused to comply and fled the country. 
Id. The Canadian court issued an arrest warrant for the primary individual defendant, but he has 
not been apprehended. Id. 
In September 2012, Equustek asked Google to remove Datalink’s websites from its search 
results. Id. ¶ 19. Google refused. Id. However, after the Canadian court granted Equustek’s request 
for injunctive relief against Datalink, Google blocked more than 300 Datalink websites from 
appearing in its Canada-specific search results at www.google.ca. Id. Google did not remove 
Datalink websites from search results targeted to users outside of Canada. Id. 
Equustek then sought a Canadian court order requiring Google to remove Datalink 
websites from its global search results. Id. ¶ 20. On June 13, 2014, the Canadian trial court issued 
an order requiring Google to delist Datalink search results worldwide. Id. ¶ 20; see also id. Ex. A 
(attaching the order from the Canadian trial court). The trial court later issued nine supplemental 
orders directing Google to delist additional websites associated with Datalink. Id. ¶ 21. Google has 
complied with the Canadian order. Id. 
Google appealed to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, which affirmed, and then to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, which issued an order affirming the trial court’s order on June 28, 
2017. Id. ¶¶ 24–25; see also id. Ex. B (attaching the order from the Supreme Court of Canada). 
Google filed this action on July 24, 2017, seeking “a declaratory judgment that the 
Canadian court’s order cannot be enforced in the United States and an order enjoining that 
  
Case No.: 5:17-cv-04207-EJD 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
enforcement.” Compl. ¶ 4. Google now moves for preliminary injunctive relief. Pl.’s Mot. for 
Prelim. Inj. Relief (“Mot.”), Dkt. No. 16. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) it is likely to succeed on 
the merits of its claims, (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 
relief, (3) the balance of equities weighs in its favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. 
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a 
“sliding scale” approach in which “the elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so 
that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Alliance for the 
Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Google argues that the Canadian order is “unenforceable in the United States because it 
directly conflicts with the First Amendment, disregards the Communication Decency Act’s 
immunity for interactive service providers, and violates principles of international comity.” 
Mot. 2. 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act “immunizes providers of interactive 
computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties.” Fair Hous. 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(en banc). It states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Congress enacted Section 230 in 1996 to address “the threat that tort-based 
lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.” Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). Section 230 does not allow internet users to 
escape accountability for publishing unlawful material; rather, it reflects Congress’s policy choice 
“not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on 
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companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.” Id. at 
330–31. 
To qualify for Section 230 immunity, Google must show that (1) it is a “provider or user of 
an interactive computer service,” (2) the information in question was “provided by another 
information content provider,” and (3) the Canadian order would hold it liable as the “publisher or 
speaker” of that information. Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(quoting 27 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)); see also Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1065 
(N.D. Cal. 2016). 
Here, Google satisfies all three elements. First, there is no question that Google is a 
“provider” of an “interactive computer service.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (“The term ‘interactive 
computer service’ means any information service, system, or access software provider that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.”); O’Kroley v. 
Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Google is an interactive computer service, an 
entity that provides ‘access by multiple users to a computer server.’ ”); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 
F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (“[T]here is no doubt that Google qualifies as an “interactive 
computer service.”); Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., No. 16-cv-03282-DM, 2017 WL 4773366, at *9 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2017) (finding that Google is a provider of an interactive computer service). 
Second, Datalink—not Google—“provides” the information at issue. Google crawls third-
party websites and adds them to its index. Compl. ¶¶ 14–16. When a user queries Google’s search 
engine, Google responds with links to relevant websites and short snippets of their contents. Id. 
Google’s search engine helps users discover and access content on third-party websites, but it does 
not “provide” that content within the meaning of Section 230. See O’Kroley, 831 F.3d at 355 
(holding that Google cannot be liable “for merely providing access to, and reproducing, the 
allegedly defamatory text” in the form of links and snippets in search engine results). 
Third, the Canadian order would hold Google liable as the “publisher or speaker” of the 
information on Datalink’s websites. The Supreme Court of Canada ordered Google to “de-index 
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the Datalink websites” from its global search results because, in the Court’s view, Google is “the 
determinative player in allowing the harm to occur” to Equustek. Compl. Ex. B ¶¶ 49, 53. The 
Ninth Circuit has held that, regardless of the underlying cause of action, a claim treats an 
intermediary as a publisher when it requires the intermediary to remove third-party content. 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009). The Barnes panel held that 
“removing content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct 
necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.” Id. 
at 1103. The Canadian order treats Google as a publisher because the order would impose liability 
for failing to remove third-party content from its search results. 
Google meets the requirements for Section 230 immunity. As such, the Court finds that 
Google is likely to prevail on the merits of its Section 230 argument.
2
  
B. Irreparable Harm, Balance of the Equities, and the Public Interest 
Google is harmed because the Canadian order restricts activity that Section 230 protects. In 
addition, the balance of equities favors Google because the injunction would deprive it of the 
benefits of U.S. federal law. See, e.g., Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1069 
(9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is clear that it would not be equitable or in the public’s interest to allow the 
state . . . to violate the requirements of federal law, especially when there are no adequate remedies 
available.”) (quoting Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
An injunction would also serve the public interest. Congress recognized that free speech on 
the internet would be severely restricted if websites were to face tort liability for hosting user-
generated content. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. It responded by enacting Section 230, which grants 
broad immunity to online intermediaries. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“Congress wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech 
on the Internet.”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3), (b)(2), (b)(3) (“The Internet and other interactive 
                                                 
2
 Since Google is likely to prevail on the merits of its Section 230 claim, it is unnecessary to 
address Google’s arguments based on the First Amendment and international comity. 
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computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for 
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity . . . It is the policy of the United 
States . . . to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
services and other interactive media [and] to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation.”). 
The Canadian order would eliminate Section 230 immunity for service providers that link 
to third-party websites. By forcing intermediaries to remove links to third-party material, the 
Canadian order undermines the policy goals of Section 230 and threatens free speech on the global 
internet.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Google’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief is GRANTED.  
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: November 2, 2017 
______________________________________ 
EDWARD J. DAVILA 
United States District Judge 
 
 
